Dispelling Myths: A Real World Perspective on Trinko by Flynn, Sean
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2005 
Dispelling Myths: A Real World Perspective on Trinko 
Sean Flynn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 50, No. 4/Winter 2005 : 589
Dispelling myths: A real world
perspective on Trinko
BY ROBERT A. JABLON,* MARK S. HEGEDUS**
AND SEAN M. FLYNN***
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's January 13, 2004 decision in Verizon Communica-
tions Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP has spawned the usual
debate about its impact on antitrust law. 2 Unlike those who take the
* Partner, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washington, DC.
** Of counsel, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washington, DC.
Associate, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washinton, DC.
AUTHORS' NOTE: We gratefully acknowledge the invaluable and insightful research
and editorial assistance of Samuel Wiseman, a second-year law student at Yale Law
School, who worked as a summer associate at Spiegel & McDiarmid in 2005.
1 540 U.S. 398 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko].
2 Because the Supreme Court does not often decide cases directly
involving the Sherman Act, when it does so its rulings engender much discus-
sion. In addition to the articles in this special issue of THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN,
see, e.g., John Thorne, A Categorical Rule Limiting Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Verizon v. Trinko, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion
and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (2005); Anthony J. Lazzaro,
Monopoly Leveraging in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP: Why the United States Supreme Court Should Draw a Clear Line for
Anticompetitive Behavior Violative of the Sherman Act, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 235
© 2006 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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view that the case's "regulated telecom context was unimportant,"3 a
view that suggests that the case's impact will extend to other industries,
we believe that the Court's holding is narrow and that it should not be
extended within, much less outside of, its regulated industry context.
The Court defined the question that it decided as "whether a com-
plaint alleging breach of the incumbent's duty under the [Telecom-
munications Act of 19961 to share its network with competitors states
a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act." 4 Its holding in this regard is
unremarkable: "We conclude that Verizon's alleged insufficient assis-
tance in the provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust
claim under this Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents."5 Funda-
mentally, the Court held that a breach of a statutory access mandate
does not, in itself, make out an antitrust violation and that it is for the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to enforce its own rules.
The Trinko decision thus may be viewed as one of rendering unto
Caesar that which is Caesar's.
Despite the narrow holding of the Trinko decision, the Court's
expansive dicta suggesting that courts should not enforce antitrust
statutes in regulated industries has given rise to concern that courts
will adopt a diminished antitrust enforcement role, thereby failing to
protect competition in regulated industries. Because the Court's dicta
are largely based on two flawed assumptions, it would be most unfor-
tunate for American consumers and the place of antitrust law as the
"Magna Carta of free enterprise" 6 if this concern proved valid.
The Court's first flawed assumption is that the potential for a
competitive response, regardless of a market's characteristics, suffices
(2004); Marie L. Fiala, Verizon v. Trinko: Limiting Section 2 Liability for Regu-
lated Enterprises, 19 FALL NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 72 (2004); Matthew L. Cantor,
Is Trinko the Last Word on a Telephone Monopolist's Duty to Deal?, 231 N.Y.L.J. 4
(2004).
3 See, e.g., Thorne, supra note 2, at 292.
4 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401.
5 Id. at410.
6 Id. at 415; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)
(referring to the Sherman Act as "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty").
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to defeat an exercise of monopoly power. The second concerns the
role of administrative agencies as substitutes for antitrust courts.
Competitive responses cannot be assumed where a monopolist can
maintain its dominant position, not because of business acumen,
superior skill, foresight or industry, but because it lacks exposure to
credible competitive threats due to market conditions, 7 including
market conditions that the monopolist itself creates. Further, adminis-
trative agencies are not institutionally equipped with adequate oper-
ating procedures, enforcement tools, authority, and independence to
displace antitrust courts. Rather than being viewed as substitutes for
one another, agencies and courts should be viewed as playing com-
plementary roles in maintaining economic competition.
We use as our template the electricity industry, which shares
some of the industry characteristics the Trinko Court claimed to con-
sider: a historically regulated industry, a regulated access regime, and
a market where the access regime is supposed to support the func-
tioning of competitive forces.8 The first half of this article focuses on
the inapplicability of the "contestable markets theory," which ani-
mates (at least implicitly) the Trinko opinion, to important segments
of the electricity industry, such as transmission and generation. After
describing the current regime in electricity, we show that these seg-
ments of the industry do not exhibit the characteristics of contestabil-
ity assumed by the Court's benign view of monopoly power.
The second half of the article turns to the Court's view that a regu-
latory agency may serve as an effective stand-in for the antitrust
court. We examine institutional differences between courts and regu-
latory agencies, with particular attention to remedial authority and
the phenomenon of regulatory capture. We also describe how regula-
tory agencies' decreasing reliance on adjudicated decisionmaking and
increasing reliance on informal procedural mechanisms lacking due
7 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (hold-
ing that the antitrust laws are not intended to punish success earned through
superior business skill or acumen).
8 However, as we note below, the market characteristics that give rise
to regulation in the first instance counsel for a robust, not a weak, antitrust
court role.
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process protections render the agencies inadequate substitutes to
carry out the antitrust function.
We close with some thoughts about how antitrust enforcement
can and must continue to play a critical role in protecting the electric-
ity industry (and other infrastructure industries) from competitive
harms. We argue that regulatory agencies and antitrust courts can
play complementary roles in advancing consumer welfare through
competitive markets.
I. MYTH #1: THE POSITIVE ROLE OF MONOPOLY
A. The regulated access regime in the electricity industry
The electricity industry is broadly divided into three segments:
generation of electricity by power plants, higher voltage transmis-
sion of electricity from the power plants to local areas (e.g., cities
and towns), and lower voltage distribution of electricity to ultimate
consumers. The traditional model of the industry involved a verti-
cally integrated utility that generated electricity at power plants it
owned, transported the electricity that it produced across its own
transmission lines, and then distributed the electricity on its own
lines to its customers. 9 All segments of generation, transmission, and
distribution were presumed to be natural monopolies. 10 The Federal
Power Act of 1935 (FPA) n instituted federal regulation of wholesale
9 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Dis-
criminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,540, 21,543 (May 10, 1996), reprinted in [1991-1996 Regs. Preambles]
FERC Stats. & Regs. 31,036 (1996); clarified, 76 F.E.R.C. 91 61,009 (1996),
modified, Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997), reprinted in
[1996-2000 Regs. Preambles] FERC Stats. & Regs. I1 31,048 (1997), order on
reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Dec. 9, 1997), 81 F.E.R.C.
1I 61,248 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 F.E.R.C. 1 61,046 (1998),
affd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study
Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom. New York v.
FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Order No. 888].
10 Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Author-
ity of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L. J. 1, 5 (2005).
11 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1935).
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generation and transmission in interstate commerce, leaving the
states as the principal regulators of distribution and sales to the end-
users- 2
For the most part, vertically integrated electric utilities were pri-
vately owned corporations. With the passage of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), 13 many such companies
were under legal strictures to operate within a single, relatively con-
fined geographic area.4 However, not all electricity was produced
and sold by investor-owned utilities (IOUs). A significant minority
was produced and sold by utilities owned by municipalities and, after
the enactment of the Rural Electrification Act in 1936,15 rural electric
cooperatives. These consumer-owned systems operated on a not-for-
profit basis to generate electricity themselves, purchase generation
and transmission as a single, "bundled" product from an adjacent or
surrounding investor-owned system, or both.16 The sales were regu-
lated by the Federal Power Commission (FPC), later renamed the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
Traditionally, vertically integrated IOUs tended not to compete with
one another, but some competition occurred between the IOUs and the
12 See Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron: Why
Bad Regulation is to Blame for California's Power Woes (or Why Antitrust Law Fails
to Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83
OREGON L. R. 207, 224-25 (2004).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1935).
14 Congress passed the FPA and PUHCA as part of a single piece of leg-
islation in 1935. Prior to PUHCA's enactment, interstate holding company
ownership of electric utilities predominated, with sixteen holding companies
producing and selling seventy-five percent of all electricity in the United
States. See Bush & Mayne, supra note 12, at 224. Congress repealed PUHCA as
part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, although it transferred limited elements
of the authority exercised by the Securities & Exchange Commission under
PUHCA to FERC. See Pub. L. No. 109-58, 199 Stat. 594 (2005).
'5 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-950(b) (1936).
16 They also purchased significant amounts of federally generated
power in some areas of the United States from U.S. government-owned gen-
eration facilities, such as Tennessee Valley Authority and Western Area
Power Administration projects.
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consumer-owned utilities.17 For example, a municipal utility might com-
pete against an IOU by convincing a new factory to locate on the munic-
ipal system rather than on an IOU's system. In addition, municipal
systems would form, displacing the IOU's service, or IOUs would
acquire the assets of municipal systems, displacing the public power
service. In fact, the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States arose against the backdrop of an IOU's policy of acquiring
municipal systems and its efforts to prevent the formation of new ones.18
During the 1960s and 1970s, several factors led to the conclusion
that at least some parts of the electricity industry could operate on a
competitive basis.19 One important factor was that consumer-owned
utilities looked for possible supply alternatives from sellers other than
the vertically integrated utility to which their transmission or distri-
bution facilities were directly connected. Municipally owned utilities
that wanted to buy from entities other than their immediately adja-
cent and almost always dominant private power supplier had, how-
ever, to have access to neighboring utilities' transmission systems to
reach those alternative sources of power supply. It was in this context
that the district court in Otter Tail, affirmed by the Supreme Court,
found Otter Tail's refusal to transmit for competitors to be an act of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.20 As a remedy
for Otter Tail's violation of the antitrust laws, the district court
enjoined Otter Tail from refusing to transmit or "wheel" power for
competing municipal systems. In affirming, the Supreme Court
emphasized that the relief ordered remained subject to subsequent
FPC regulatory authority, thereby avoiding jurisdictional conflicts.21
License conditions imposed on the construction or operation of
nuclear power plants also sometimes included obligations that
17 Consumer-owned utilities are often referred to as "public power."
18 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1973).
19 See, e.g., PAUL JOSKOW AND RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER:
AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983).
20 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F.
Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
21 Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 375-77, 381-82.
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licensees transmit electricity across their transmission lines for other,
usually smaller, utilities. 22 Utilities also began increasing their inter-
connections with neighboring utilities in order to share generation
resources, initially because one or another utility system could expe-
rience a generation outage, 23 but increasingly because one utility
could produce electricity more cheaply than its neighbor and had
excess to sell.2
4
Besides the growth of utility-to-utility sales of electricity, two con-
gressional enactments helped spawn the development of a nonutility
generator sector and the idea that competition instead of regulated
monopolies might be relied upon to determine prices, at least for the
generation of electricity. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA),25 passed in 1978, required traditional utilities to intercon-
nect with and purchase power from nonutility generators, known as
"qualifying facilities," at the rate at which the utility could avoid
22 See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892 (1977); Toledo Edison
Co. & Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979).
23 See Bush & Mayne, supra note 12, at 217; Kelliher, supra note 10, at 6.
24 Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544-45. Here, too, antitrust courts
became involved, because of utility refusals to deal with smaller, public
power competitors. In Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 573
F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1978), the court affirmed a verdict finding Florida Power &
Light's refusal to interconnect with the City of Gainesville utility violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Fla. Power
Corp., 402 U.S. 515 (1971), an FPC case on appellate review, deals with the
problems of IOU refusals to "interconnect" their transmission systems with
municipal systems and enter into power sales and purchases on a basis of
equality. In City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1969), affd
sub nom. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, Judge Leventhal
described the Supreme Court's affirmance of the FPC in Gainesville v. Florida
Power Corp. as rejecting "the claim of a private utility to make an intercon-
nection with a municipally-owned utility on terms more onerous tha[n]
those required of other investor-owned utilities." A physical electrical inter-
connection and interconnection agreements provided the mechanisms under
which transmission and various forms of power sales and purchases could
take place.
25 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of
Titles 15, 16, 30, 42, and 43 of the United States Code) (1978).
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producing or purchasing its next increment of power.26 Even though
promoting competition in generation was not a goal of PURPA, it
had that effect by creating new nonutility generators. At the same
time, high electricity rates, including high avoided-cost rates, put
pressure on regulators to deregulate markets in the hope of reducing
electricity rates. 27
The second legislative enactment, the Energy Policy Act of 1992
(the Energy Policy Act),28 explicitly sought to advance development of
competitive power supply markets by authorizing a new generation
of power producers, "exempt wholesale generators." These genera-
tors were exempted from numerous regulations imposed on utilities.
The Energy Policy Act also provided FERC with expanded authority
to order that utilities provide access to transmission lines.29
During the 1980s and early 1990s, FERC itself began to authorize
utilities to sell wholesale power at rates set by market forces rather
than by cost-of-service regulation under the theory that competition
would encourage efficiency and lead to lower rates than traditional
regulated monopoly pricing.3° Among other criteria, FERC allowed
market-based rates only if the seller had opened its transmission sys-
tem to competitors.31 It also began applying its expanded authority
under the Energy Policy Act to order public utilities to provide trans-
26 Order No. 888,61 Fed. Reg. at 21,545.
27 Bush & Mayne, supra note 12, at 214; Kelliher, supra note 10, at 7-8. See
also the California Public Utilities Commission's initial deregulation order,
Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Proposed Policies Gov-
erning Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming
Regulation; Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Proposed
Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and
Reforming Regulation, Rulemaking No. 94-04-031, 1994 Cal. PUC LEXIS 336
(April 20, 1994).
28 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Titles 2, 11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33, 38, 40, 42 and 43 of the United
States Code) (1992).
29 Bush & Mayne, supra note 12, at 219-20; Kelliher, supra note 10, at 7-8.
30 Kelliher, supra note 10, at 8-9.
31 Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,546.
A REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVE : 597
mission access to wholesale customers, but it found that the substan-
tial time delays involved in processing requests for service impeded
the development of competitive markets.32 Ultimately, FERC con-
cluded that the development of competitive markets required that all
public utilities have open access transmission tariffs on file with the
Commission. Using its authority under the FPA to remedy undue dis-
crimination in the provision of transmission services,33 FERC insti-
tuted the tariff obligation and prescribed a detailed pro forma tariff to
be filed by all public utilities.34
As a result of the foregoing developments, all transmission facili-
ties coming under FERC's jurisdiction are now subject to open access
tariffs that require public utilities to provide transmission access to
third parties in order to promote wholesale electricity competition.35
In setting rates for sales of wholesale power, FERC has continued the
shift away from cost-of-service ratemaking and toward reliance on
market forces, so that today cost-based rates are the exception rather
than the rule for most wholesale electricity sales. FERC has assumed
the authority to rely upon market-based pricing rather than cost-
based ratemaking whenever a seller lacks market power or has taken
adequate steps to mitigate that power.36 FERC policy now relies upon
the theory that "[in a competitive market, where neither buyer nor
seller has significant market power, it is rational to assume that the
terms of their voluntary exchange are reasonable, and specifically to
infer that price is close to marginal cost, such that the seller makes
only a normal return on its investment." 37
Although FERC's move away from cost-of-service ratemaking is
often referred to as "deregulation," in legal theory FERC's actions
32 Id. at 21,547.
33 Id. at 21,560.
34 Id. at 21,597.
35 Id. at 21,693-94.
36 AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 107 F.E.R.C. 61,018, order on reh'g, 108
F.E.R.C. T 61,026 (2004).
37 Kelliher, supra note 10, at 9 (quoting Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908
F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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represent more of a shift away from regulating the price of power
supplied toward regulating the structure of the market in which the
price is set.38 Thus, FERC has established rules for assessing whether
or not a seller has market power, 39 as well as measures to mitigate
market power. 0 FERC's rules require the reporting of transactions
entered into pursuant to a seller's market-based rate authorization.41
FERC requires reporting of any changes in the seller's status that bear
on the circumstances FERC relied upon in approving market based-
rates.4 2 FERC also requires that all market-based rate tariffs incorporate
a set of market behavior rules that prohibit, for example, withholding
power supplies in order to manipulate prices or failing to follow elec-
tricity market rules. 43 Sellers found to have violated the rules face
potential disgorgement of profits associated with their behavior and,
in certain cases, revocation of their FERC authorization to sell at mar-
ket-based rates." In addition, sellers participating in what FERC
-8 Kelliher, supra note 10, at 11; Bush & Mayne, supra note 12, at 208-09.
39 See AEP Power Marketing, supra note 36. FERC's rules, announced in
AEP Power Marketing, id., may be the subject of further development pursuant
to the generic rulemaking it initiated in April 2004. Market-Based Rates For
Public Utilities, RM04-7-000, 107 F.E.R.C. 9 61,019 (2004).
40 See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 108
F.E.R.C. T 61,163 (2004), order on reh'g, 109 F.E.R.C. T 61,157 (2004), order on
reh'g, 111 F.E.R.C. 9 61,043 (2005), order on reh'g, 112 F.E.R.C. 9 61,086
(2005).
41 Revised Public Utility Filing Requirements, Order No. 2001, 67 Fed.
Reg. 31,043 (May 8, 2002), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles] FERC Stat. & Regs.
31,127 (2002).
42 Reporting Requirement for Changes in Status for Public Utilities with
Market-Based Rate Authority, Order No. 652, 70 Fed. Reg. 8,253 (Feb. 18,
2005), reprinted in [Regs. Preambles] FERC Stat. & Regs. 9 31,175 (2005), order
on reh'g, 111 F.E.R.C. 1 61,413 (2005).
43 Investigation of Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based
Rate Authorizations, 105 F.E.R.C. 1 61,218 (2003), order on reh'g, 107 F.E.R.C.
9 61,175 (2004), on appeal sub nom. Cinergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, appeal dock-
eted, No. 04-1168 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2004).
4 Id. At least for traditionally vertically integrated utilities that revert to
cost-based tariffs, the loss of market-based rate authority may not be conse-
A REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVE : 599
describes as "organized" markets operated by Independent Transmis-
sion System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations
are subject to a broad array of rules governing, among other things,
bidding behavior, price setting, and the monitoring of markets for
exercises of market power.45
With its rules for network access and policies seeking to promote
competitive markets, FERC's regulatory regime appears similar to the
telecommunications regime that prompted the Trinko Court to refuse
to create what it called a new exception to the right of a business to
refuse to deal or cooperate with rivals.46 However, general application
of the limited antitrust role underlying the Trinko decision would
wrongly assume that all regulated industries exhibit the kinds of
competitive characteristics that might argue against antitrust inter-
vention. As the next section explores, such characteristics cannot be
assumed in markets such as electricity and perhaps in most infra-
structure industries.
B. Contestable markets theory does not apply to
electricity markets
The Trinko decision reflects an expectation that monopoly power
can be procompetitive and that antitrust intervention can be counter-
productive. According to the Court:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element
of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-
at least for a short period-is what attracts "business acumen" in the first
quential given FERC's tendency to approve high price caps under these
cost-based rate tariffs. Pursuant to FERC's cost-based tariffs, utilities are
permitted to negotiate prices below the cap, but the caps can be quite exor-
bitant. See Detroit Edison Co., 78 F.E.R.C. I 61,149 (1997) (cap set at capa-
city cost of most expensive plant on system). The negotiating flexibility
afforded utilities under these cost-based tariffs is significant, and the sellers
are not subject to FERC's market behavior rules, which are imposed only on
market-based rate tariffs.
45 Kelliher, supra note 10, at 14.
46 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-09.
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place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by
an element of anticompetitive conduct.
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure
that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling
such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with
the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive
for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically ben-
eficial facilities. 47
Later, in discussing the potential cost of antitrust intervention, the
Court quotes its decision in Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp. in observing: "Mistaken inferences and the resulting false
condemnations 'are especially costly, because they chill the very con-
duct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."' 48 In Matsushita, the
Court noted that such conduct includes "cutting prices to increase
business." 49
Under the Court's "monopoly is good" view, competition,
whether by pricing or other means such as innovation, is promoted
by monopoly power. An attempt by a monopolist to charge supra-
competitive prices will invite price cutting by more efficient rivals,
regardless of whether the rivals are already in the market or whether
they are induced to enter as a result of incumbents' high prices and
the prospect of acquiring market share. In addition, the promise of
earning monopoly profits-"at least for a short period of time" 50-
encourages innovation, whether by the seller who brings its product
to the market first, or by its rival who later contests that market
through the introduction of a new or better product.
Implicit in the Court's view of the procompetitive role played by
monopoly power is the assumption that even monopolists face com-
petition because of the threat of entry or innovation by rivals and
47 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08.
4 Id. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
49 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
50 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
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potential rivals. In other words, a monopoly market may be deemed
potentially competitive, because of the credible threat that a rival may
displace the monopolist by innovating or by performing more effi-
ciently and under-cutting the monopolist's price. In this respect, the
Court's view reflects elements of contestable markets theory.
Under contestable markets theory,5 1 "even a monopolist must
operate in an efficient manner and must earn no more than a normal
rate of return on its capital investments," because of the competitive
pressure exerted by potential entrants. 52 According to Professor Reza
Dibadj:
The key element of contestability is that a market is vulnerable to com-
petitive forces even when it is currently occupied by an oligopoly or a
monopoly. That is, if any incumbent is inefficient or charges excessive
prices or exploits consumers in any other way, successful entry must be
possible and profitable.5 3
In the words of leading proponents of contestable markets theory:
A contestable market may contain only a single monopoly enterprise
whose as-yet unidentified competitors are nevertheless in the wings
awaiting their entry cue .... Monopolists and oligopolists who populate
such markets are sheep in wolves' clothing, for under this arrangement
potential rivals can be as effective as actual competitors in forcing pro
social behavior upon incumbents, whether or not such behavior is attrac-
tive to them.-4
Core features of the theory include ease of entry and exit, with the
latter-also called "reversibility "-being a critical factor. "With
reversibility, this process involving entry, the earning of possibly tem-
porary profits at the initial prices of incumbents, and then exit will be
profitable overall to the entrant."5 5 Bailey and Baumol underscore the
role played by freedom of entry and exit. A contestable market is
51 See generally, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANzAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
52 Id. at 6.
53 Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 759 (2004).
54 BAUMOL, ET AL., supra note 51, at 350.
11 Id. at 6-7.
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characterized by the "availability of a pool of potential entrants able
to respond quickly to an entry opportunity and to choose the timing,
place, and manner of entry that best suits the circumstances."56 Fur-
ther, "preclusion of, or restraints on, exit discourage entry and
thereby reduce the competitive threat posed by the availability of
potential entrants. '57
Similar to the Trinko Court's view that monopoly power can be a
good thing, contestable markets theory supposes that "concentration,
price discrimination, conglomerate mergers, or vertical or horizontal
integration.., can be desirable and should, indeed, be presumed so,
with the burden shifted to those who in any particular case maintain
the contrary." 58 That supposition is very similar to the Trinko Court
statement that "mere possession of monopoly power, and the con-
comitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful, it is
an important element of the free-market system," because it "induces
risk-taking that produces innovation and economic growth."5 9
The Court's assumption of contestable markets appears to apply
regardless of the market. The opinion draws no distinction between
those markets for which such contestability may be factually assumed
and those for which it may not. Unlike, perhaps, the Court or those who
claim that Trinko announces a rule of general applicability, the authors
of contestability theory do not see it applying across the board nor do
they envision a necessarily limited antitrust role in all circumstances:
In fields where technological conditions and other unavoidable circum-
stances impose heavy sunk costs and other obstacles to exit and entry,
markets will not be contestable and the market mechanism cannot always
be trusted to produce benign results. In such circumstances, one may, for
example, still not wish to preclude single-firm production in an industry
that is clearly a natural monopoly. But this monopoly will be a legitimate
candidate for regulation or antitrust scrutiny.60
56 Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of
Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 120 (1984).
57 Id.
58 BAUMOL, ET AL., supra note 51, at 477.
59 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
60 BAUMOL, ET AL., supra note 51, at 477-78.
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Substantial entry barriers impede entry by firms that could under-
mine monopoly prices and profits, while significant sunk costs that
cannot be recouped without substantial delay present additional
impediments to contestability. 61
[T]here are in many industries what may be described as "natural" barri-
ers, i.e., barriers that arise out of technological circumstances. For exam-
ple, the technology of an industry may require heavy sunk investments
on the part of entrants, as we have seen. An investment that cannot easily
be moved elsewhere is an impediment to exit, which, as has been shown,
is in turn a prime obstacle to entry.62
Because the characteristics of contestability are not found in all
markets, "a market-by-market analysis within the industry may have
to be undertaken." 63 In this respect, the Trinko Court correctly
observed that "[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the par-
ticular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue."64 Thus, a
conclusion that the Court's benign attitude towards monopoly power
applied to the Trinko facts should represent antitrust policy across all
markets and industries ignores the Court's admonition to be sensitive
to the particularities of an industry. *
Electricity markets are clearly candidates for noncontestability. As
Professor Dibadj points out, because of significant sunk costs "many
large-scale infrastructure industries, such as transportation and
energy, are noncontestable." 65 Transmission readily comes to mind as
a noncontestable segment of the electricity industry where one should
not diminish antitrust scrutiny under the naive expectation that
potential rivals are standing ready to build competing transmission
61 Bailey & Baumol, supra note 56, at 113-14. It is important to distin-
guish between "sunk costs" and "fixed costs." Significant cost outlays that
can be readily recovered by moving the capital asset to another market are
not sunk. A classic example is a commercial airplane, which costs lots of
money, but can be readily moved to another market if its current use is not
profitable. BAUMOL, ET AL., supra note 51, at 283-84.
62 Bailey & Baumol, supra note 56, at 123-24.
63 Id. at 137.
64 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
65 Dibadj, supra note 53, at 765.
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systems. Transmission projects involve substantial sunk costs. Even if,
in theory, one could move transmission equipment, such as lines,
switches and towers, to other markets, in the event entry into the
original market did not prove profitable, the same does not apply to
the investment associated with acquiring rights-of-way to build lines
across property owned by others. Such rights-of-way cannot be trans-
ferred and used on other pieces of land. Further, the transmission
grid itself is a highly complex mechanism, and additions to it require
engineering studies, the results of which are also not readily transfer-
able to other markets.
Entry in the form of duplication of a rival's grid is also unlikely.
The sunk costs associated with transmission, described above, would
remain. Transmission siting itself is difficult because of the public
resistance to having transmission lines built near homes, schools, and
other sensitive locations. Further, transmission has characteristics of a
network industry where a product's value depends, in part, on the
number of buyers and sellers that the network can link.66 A transmis-
sion line connecting a single generator to a single customer has value
only to those two entities. However, if the line connects to other lines,
its value increases. 67 Innovation also seems unlikely to render current
transmission systems obsolete.68
Entry barriers are not limited to transmission. Generation facilities
usually involve significant sunk costs associated with site approval
and acquisition, as well as engineering design. A plant may require
the construction of additional transmission facilities to connect the
66 Network industries are those "in which the value of a good or service
increases as it is more widely used by others. For example, the telephone sys-
tem becomes more valuable as the number of other users becomes greater."
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JoHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW I 776c
(2d ed. 2002) (footnote omitted).
67 See supra notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text.
68 Dibadj, supra note 53, at 836-37. So far, only Mother Nature has figured
out how to transmit electricity using clouds. While research continues on devel-
oping superconducting materials that can transmit large amounts of electricity,
such technologies are aimed at enlarging the capacity of the existing grid, not at
building a new, competing system that would displace the current one.
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plant to the grid. Once incurred, these costs cannot be recouped by
building the plant elsewhere if the original investment turns out not
to be profitable. While some pieces of equipment at a generating sta-
tion, such as the turbine, might be used elsewhere (however, often
only by making significant, additional expenditures), such equipment
represents only a portion of the total investment and is less likely to
be reusable elsewhere in the case of larger, more efficient facilities
that require specialized design.69
Entry in the electricity industry also usually involves regulatory
approvals. Describing impediments to contestability, Bailey and Bau-
mol note that a "regulatory process in which lengthy hearings and
evidence of public convenience and necessity are prerequisites to
entry is precisely what is not required." 70 Such approvals involve not
only governmental authorizations regarding land use and air emis-
sions, for example, but also engineering approvals from the operator
of the transmission system regarding the ability of the transmission
grid to accommodate the new facility. In many cases, the transmission
grid operator is also the utility against whose generation the new
entrant seeks to compete. Regulatory approvals can also be required
to exit a market.71
The absence of contestability in sectors of the electricity industries
is aggravated by the incentives for incumbents to discourage entry. In
the Trinko Court's idealized world, the monopolist, threatened by
entry, should compete harder. It should use its business acumen to
innovate, produce its products more efficiently and, as a result, cut
prices or bring new and improved products to market. However, in
69 For example, large coal plants are frequently built at the mouths of
coal mines in order to save fuel transportation costs. However, most markets
do not enjoy proximity to coal deposits, making it impractical to move coal-
fired generation plants to another market if the investment in the original
market proves unprofitable.
70 Bailey & Baumol, supra note 56, at 120.
71 See, e.g., ISO New England Inc., FERC Elec. Tariff Volume No. 3, Gen-
eral Terms and Conditions, Section 1.3.9., available at http://www.iso-ne
.com/regulatory/tariff/sectjl /Section_I_GeneralTerms_andConditions.pdf
(last visited September 16, 2005).
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electricity markets, many incumbents enjoy the ability to thwart com-
petition, not by competing harder, but by blocking the efforts of oth-
ers to compete.
For example, some electricity markets experience high prices
because of the absence of more efficient plants, whether located on
the system or capable of selling into the system over transmission
lines. Often the monopoly owner of the transmission grid also owns
generation facilities producing power that is sold in the same, high-
priced markets. It has an interest in maintaining high prices by keep-
ing new, more efficient entrants out. The transmission owner thus has
an incentive to maintain a transmission system with capacity inade-
quate to accommodate new entry and the means to do so by refusing
to expand the grid, or by rejecting offers by those seeking to do so.72
Such a market cannot be deemed contestable.
In sum, Trinko's premise that the need for antitrust enforcement in
modern infrastructure industries has been lessened because regulatory
open access regimes will support contestable markets is wrong.
Because of inherent impediments to contestability, the electricity
industry is one example where monopoly power remains a significant
concern, despite (and perhaps due to) "deregulation." Further, incum-
bents often have the ability to keep competitors out, not through com-
peting harder, but by erecting barriers. It would be a mistake to rely
on Trinko to diminish antitrust enforcement in such industries.
II. MYTH #2: ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
CAN FULFILL THE ANTITRUST ROLE
In addition to espousing a benign view of market power in regu-
lated industries, the Court's dicta in Trinko are troublesome in their
apparent endorsement of the view that regulatory agencies can dis-
place courts as the enforcers of antitrust norms.
As we noted earlier, the actual holding of Trinko, leaving to the
FCC the responsibility to enforce the access mandates in laws directly
entrusted to its jurisdiction and in its own regulations rather than
"adding the present case to the few exceptions from the proposition
72 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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that there is no duty to aid competitors, 73 is relatively unremarkable.
But the Trinko decision has an undercurrent, perhaps an undertow,
suggesting that there is a strict demarcation of authority between
antitrust courts and administrative agencies with the former being
confined to enforcement of antitrust rules in unregulated industries
and the latter having principal (if not sole) authority to enforce
antitrust policy in the industries that they regulate. 74
The Court begins with the unexceptional premise that "[aintitrust
analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and cir-
cumstances of the industry at issue." 75 Thus, in analyzing possible
antitrust violations in the telecommunications industry, an antitrust
court would have to take "careful account of the pervasive federal
and state regulation characteristic of the industry."76 The Court then
explains:
One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory struc-
ture designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a
structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by
antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible
that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny. Where, by
contrast, "[there is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which per-
forms the antitrust function," the benefits of antitrust are worth its some-
times considerable disadvantages. Just as regulatory context may in other
cases serve as a basis for implied immunity, it may also be a considera-
tion in deciding whether to recognize an expansion of the contours of § 2.
The regulatory framework that exists in this case demonstrates how, in
certain circumstances, regulation significantly diminishes the likelihood
of major antitrust harm.77
After reviewing the FCC's regulation of Verizon, including a "com-
petitive checklist, which ... includes the nondiscriminatory provision
of access" as well as "continuing oversight," the Court concludes that
73 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 399.
74 Id. at 411.
75 Id.
76 Id. (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91
(1975)).
77 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412 (citations omitted).
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the regulatory "regime was an effective steward of the antitrust func-
tion."78 The Court further says, "fe]ffective remediation of violations
of regulatory sharing requirements will ordinarily require continuing
supervision of a highly detailed decree .... An antitrust court is
unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer of these detailed shar-
ing obligations." 79
It is worth noting again that the issue in Trinko was narrowly
stated to be limited to "deciding whether to recognize an expansion of
the contours of § 2."80 The Trinko decision does not say, but comes
close to saying, that courts need not enforce the existing section 2
monopolization provisions where administrative agencies have juris-
diction over the day-to-day enforcement of competitive access condi-
tions. The reference to the doctrine of implied immunity in this
regard is particularly troublesome.81 The Court's judgment may be
viewed by federal judges as a signal to apply similar reasoning in the
implied immunity context and back off antitrust enforcement in net-
work and infrastructure industries, even those subject to deregula-
tion mandates or policies. For these industries, the Court appears to
view antitrust as being served adequately by leaving section 2
enforcement to the agencies that allegedly have more specialized
knowledge and greater oversight capability than courts. This
approach must be rejected.8 2
78Id. at 412-13.
79 Id. at 414-15.
80 See id. at 412. See also id. at 401 ("we consider whether a complaint
alleging breach.., under the [Telecommunications Act of 1960 also] states a
claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act.").
81 Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422
U. S. 694, 730-35 (1975)).
82 Many, if not all, regulated industries are undergoing a transforma-
tion, in whole or in part, from monopoly to more competitive industry struc-
tures. However, perhaps because of their history as regulated monopolies as
well as industry characteristics (e.g., essential services produced by high-cost
investments), such industries are often found to have structures susceptible
to the exercise of monopoly power. In this context, the Court's statement that
antitrust enforcement by courts is less important in these industries is
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A. The law requires courts to enforce the Sherman Act
in regulated industries
The most fundamental reason not to create judicial limitations on
section 2 enforcement in regulated industries is that doing so would
adopt a policy not to enforce the antitrust laws or to enforce them
weakly. Because antitrust law is basic national policy, it has long been
held that antitrust exemptions are disfavored."3 Indeed, such implica-
tions would be contrary to the clear language of the many regulatory
statutes, including the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act)
and the FPA, that have antitrust savings clauses.84
This is not to say that antitrust courts cannot, or should not, take
regulatory policies and actions into account. As the Court in Trinko
points out, regulation is part of the structure of the markets in which
regulated industries operate, so it is relevant to any antitrust analysis
contrary to the more common view that movement toward competition
should lead to an increased role for antitrust in the regulated industries.
[DIeregulation has given antitrust an expanding role in many mar-
kets, such as telecommunications, electric power, and commercial
aviation, to name a few. As an increasing number of activities in
these markets pass out of the realm of strict agency control and into
the realm of private, market-based decision making, antitrust picks
up where the regulatory regime leaves off.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Treatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 815, 832 (1996). See also Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory
Schizophrenia, 75 CAUF. L. REV. 1059 (1987) ("While prepared to defend enthu-
siastically the deregulations with which I have been involved, I feel equally
strongly that they have greatly accentuated the importance of antitrust
enforcement."); Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Competition
Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches, Remarks
at Glasser LegalWorks Seminar on Competitive Policy in Communications
Industries 1 (Mar. 10, 1997), available at http://www.ftc gov/speeches/pitof-
sky/newcomm.htm.
83 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Con-
sumers Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892, 916 (1977).
84 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (Telecommunications Act of 1996); 16 U.S.C.
§ 824(k) (1935) (Federal Power Act of 1935); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(c)(2)
(1994) (Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950).
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in the field. 85 Courts have mechanisms to consider regulatory policies
ranging from giving precedential or even preclusive effect to regula-
tory decisions86 to primary jurisdiction referrals.8 7 But courts are no
more free than agencies to ignore violations of the law on the premise
that enforcement may be burdensome or inconvenient. 88
Nor should the perceived superior expertise of industry-specific
regulators be used as subterfuge for an abdication of judicial respon-
sibility for antitrust enforcement.8 9 Like courts, agencies may hear
from experts.90 However, it would be difficult to conclude that regula-
tors' greater focus on particular industry problems has led to wiser
competition policy or that the policies reached have, in fact, flowed
from expert knowledge.91 In agencies no less than in courts, there are
85 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411-12 (quoting Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S.
86, 91 (1975) ("careful account must be taken of the pervasive federal and
state regulation characteristic of the industry") and Town of Concord v.
Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) ("antitrust analysis must
sensitively recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of
the regulated industry to which it applies")).
86 United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining, 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Univ. of
Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
87 See Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d
1313, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
88 See FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 400 (1974) ("It may be ... that the
assumptions of the 1930's about the competitive structure of the natural gas
industry, if true then, are no longer true today ... [,]" but "[it is not the
Court's role ... to overturn congressional assumptions embedded into the
framework of regulation ... ").
89 Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 471
(1954) (commenting that "[e]xpertness has been oversold in this country").
90 The issue may be less one of knowledge and more one of whether one
wants the antitrust laws to be followed or whether one wants them to be one
factor among many that contribute to administrative policy judgments.
91 Likewise, the expertise of courts may be understated. A reading of the
district court decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2000), dealing with the highly technical computer software industry,
demonstrates the capability of courts to deal with complex issues through
focused attention, expert and fact witnesses, evidence, and other vehicles. Court
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often a "cacophony of experts" on either side of any substantive issue
and decisions therefore call for the kind of balancing and reasoned
analysis of a record that courts are well adept at performing.92
B. Agencies are not effective substitutes for courts
The Court seems to view antitrust courts and administrative agen-
cies as performing much the same function. Therefore, it appears
comfortable leaving antitrust enforcement in regulated industries to
administrative agencies. This comfort is misplaced not only because
courts are required to apply the law, as is discussed above, but also
because courts and administrative agencies often act far differently in
both their procedural and substantive decisionmaking. Deference will
often mean abandonment of antitrust enforcement.
1. AGENCIES HAVE NO POWER TO ORDER IMPORTANT ANTITRUST
REMEDIES One very important difference between court enforcement
of antitrust laws and agency enforcement of regulatory statutes,
including where agencies promote competition, is in the area of
remedies. Agency statutes often do not provide for (or have limitations
on) retrospective damages and other kinds of relief that are available
to antitrust courts.93 This is especially important in enforcement of the
antitrust laws where the prospect of treble damages creates an
important deterrent to illegal conduct. Nor can agencies impose
criminal penalties, another powerful deterrent available under
antitrust statutes. 94 Moreover, agencies often have other procedural
and substantive limitations on the relief that they may order.95
decision after court decision shows that courts can handle complex economic mat-
ters. And courts have additional tools available, including agency referrals under
primary jurisdiction or similar doctrines and inviting agency and amid briefs.
92 Schwartz, supra note 89, at 472.
93 E.g., Natural Gas Act, § 4e, 15 U.S.C. 717c(e) (1938); Federal Power
Act, §§ 205, 206, 16 U.S.C. 824d, e. (1935); Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 284 U.S. 370 (1932) (Interstate Commerce Com-
mission lacks reparations power); FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 24
(1968) (FPC has no reparations power).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1890).
95 See, e.g., Bonneville Power Admin. v. FERC, 422 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir.
2005) (limitation on FERC's refund authority).
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The administrative record preceding the Trinko decision is an
excellent example of how administrative agencies often have inade-
quate tools at their disposal to deter anticompetitive conduct. In
December 1999, the FCC granted Verizon's (then Bell Atlantic's)
application to enter the interLATA long distance market in New York
State based on its "conclusion that Bell Atlantic has taken the statuto-
rily required steps to open its local exchange and exchange access
markets to competition." 96 But within several months Verizon was
already admitting that it was breaching its open access commitments
for which it paid a $3 million fine to the FCC, and $10 million to com-
petitive local exchange carriers. 97
The Trinko court portrayed the FCC action against Verizon as
showing that the regulatory structure was sufficient to remedy and
deter anticompetitive conduct. But then-FCC Chairman Powell drew
a markedly different conclusion in a subsequent communication to
Congress. He explained that "[gliven the vast resources of many of
the nation's [incumbent local exchange carriers]," the FCC's maxi-
mum fine "is insufficient to punish and to deter violations in many
instances." 98 He advised both increasing the forfeiture limits "to
enhance the deterrent effect of [FCC] fines" and giving the FCC the
authority to award punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs99 in
formal complaint cases filed under Section 208 of the 1996 Act. 100
Congress has not provided new remedies under the 1996 Act. Of
course, the kinds of remedies that Powell was requesting are already
available under the antitrust laws. But the result of Trinko was to pre-
vent courts from using these powers to provide appropriate deter-
96 In re Application of Bell Atl. N. Y., 15 F.C.C.R. 3953, 3956 & n.2 (1999)
(cited in Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413).
97 In re Bell Atlantic, 15 F.C.C.R. 5413 (2000) (consent decree).
98 Letter from Michael Powell, Chairman, FCC, to leaders of the Senate
and House Commerce and Appropriations Committees (Friday, May 4,2001),
available at http://ftp.fcc.gov /Bureaus/CommonCarrier/NewsReleases
/2001/nrcc0l16.html.
99 Id.
100 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1996).
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rents to Verizon in that case. Such a model should not be extended
elsewhere.
2. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF AGENCIES COMPROMISE THEIR ROLE
AS IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATORS A second reason for not unduly
privileging agency over court enforcement of antitrust law is
institutional. Courts and agencies are very different decisionmaking
bodies with different strengths and weaknesses.
One of the pillars of the rule of law is expressed by Justice John
Marshall's statement that we live under "a government of laws, and
not of men." 101 Legislatures are primarily responsible for generally
applicable laws that result from a balancing of interests within the
political process. Ideally, courts apply law in individual cases neu-
trally through a reasoning process that is at least theoretically
divorced from political influences.
The institutional structure and processes of courts, including life-
time appointments, strict ex parte communications rules, and require-
ments that decisions be justified by. factual records and elaborations
of neutral legal norms, are all designed to encourage reasoned and
impartial decisionmaking. 102 Agencies are structured very differently,
perhaps due to the fact that they perform both legislative and adjudi-
catory functions.
At the top tier of many regulatory agencies is a bipartisan com-
mission of political appointees, who serve for set terms and after-
ward often seek employment in the industries that they regulate or
in the many legal, financial and lobbying firms that represent
them.103 Some agencies are headed by a single political appointee; all
appointees must obtain Senate confirmation and lack the lifetime
tenure that would separate them from further political influence.
101 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
102 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKNG AND APPUCATION OF LAW, 146-48 (1994).
103 For example, former FERC chairwoman, Elizabeth Moler, is Executive
Vice President, Government and Environmental Affairs and Public Policy, of
Exelon Corporation. Former FERC chairman, Curt L. H6bert Jr., is Executive
Vice President, External Affairs, of Entergy Corporation.
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Agency budgets and expenditures of money go through the execu-
tive review process and must be congressionally approved. Agencies
are subject to congressional oversight and the possibility of new
statutory enactments. In short, their actions are deeply affected by
the political process.
The political structure of regulatory commissions makes them
more susceptible than courts to the influence of the industries that
they regulate as well as of other interested parties. Thus, even at the
genesis of many regulatory commissions, prominent commentators
were predicting that "the older the commission gets to be, the more
inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of
things." 10 4 In 1960, James Landis, the late dean of Harvard Law School
and a prominent advocate of administrative authority,105 reported to
President-elect Kennedy on the tendency of agency tribunals to reflect
industry positions because of the "daily machine-gun-like impact" of
industry lobbyists and lawyers in formal and informal agency pro-
cesses. 1°6 Others have attributed regulatory "capture" to the tendency
of agencies to consider themselves responsible for the health of the
industry they regulate, which can lead them to favor industry
demands over consumer concerns and interests1'
104 Letter from Richard Olney, 40th U.S. Attorney General, to Charles
Perkins, President of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, December
28, 1892, in Louis Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A
Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.7 (1954).
105 See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
106 Landis wrote:
Irrespective of the absence of social contacts and the acceptance
of undue hospitality, it is the daily machine-gun-like impact on
both agency and its staff of industry representation that makes
for industry orientation on the part of many honest and capable
agency members as well as agency staffs.
James Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect (1960), in
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, WORKING ON THE SYsTEM: A CoMPRE-
HENSIVE MANUAL FOR CITIZEN AcCESS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES 14 (James R. Michael
ed. 1974).
107 See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REv. 713 (1986).
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Further, officials who do not bend to industry desires may find
themselves subject to retribution. Unhappy with Justice Department
positions in the Microsoft case, for example, Microsoft mounted a cam-
paign against the Department of Justice Antitrust Division budget.108
Recently, apparently against their legal judgments, Justice Depart-
ment attorneys were forced to limit claims against the cigarette indus-
try. 109 As a result of these and other factors, administrative agencies
by their nature tend to perform a less judicial role than courts. FERC
finds itself subject to similar political pressures. Members of Congress
have been known to insert provisions in bills bearing on agencies'
jurisdiction or funding to discourage FERC from pursuing unwel-
come policy initiatives)' 0 Political interference with agency decision-
making has been legion."' Although such political pressure may not
always be inappropriate when an agency is engaged in policymaking,
it is certainly not the hallmark of an independent adjudication of
antitrust claims.
108 Dan Morgan & Juliet Eilperin, Microsoft Targets Funding for Antitrust
Office, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al.
109 Eric Lichtblau, Lawyers Fought U.S. Move to Curb Tobacco Penalty, N. Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2005, at 1.
110 Southern Company and Entergy Corporation, for example, are
opposed to certain forms of Regional Transmission Organization membership
and control. Sens. Trent Lott (R-Miss) and Richard Shelby (R-Ala) have con-
sistently fought FERC's efforts to make such membership mandatory, includ-
ing the insertion of language into the failed November 2003 Energy Bill that
would have prevented FERC from forcing any company to participate in its
Standard Market Design until 2007. See David Ivanovich, Wood is on a hot seat;
Federal Energy Agency's Leader has Powerful Critics, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 16,
2005 (Star Edition), at Business 1; Jeff Barber, Southern Senators "Troubled" by
FERC's Recent Moves Advancing Restructuring, Inside Energy/with Federal
Lands, July 26, 2004, Electric Power at 7.
I Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Tex) added what came to be known as the
"Enron Exemption" to the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act,
exempting electronic derivative traders from disclosing the details of their
trades. Tim Fleck & Brian Wallstin, Enron's End Run, THE DALLAS OBSERVER,
Feb. 7, 2002 at 6. The recently passed Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains
numerous provisions that put political pressure on FERC to accommodate
congressional concerns on a range of issues. See, e.g., sections 1236 and 1824 of
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-58, 199 Stat. 594 (2005).
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The ability of agencies to adjudicate cases impartially is further
hampered by the conflicting interests that many agencies must
consider. Even where agencies have procompetitive agendas,
antitrust or other issues will not be decided in a vacuum that
ignores the implications of decisions on other agency functions.
Agencies need some industry support for policies that they want
to advance, lest they find themselves under congressional and
executive attack.
Even where agencies have express authority to include antitrust
considerations within their regulatory functions, they often neglect
to fully enforce antitrust principles in deference to other functions on
which they place a higher priority. As agency processes tilt away
from the consumer interests that the agencies theoretically protect
and toward claimed industry needs for investment, agency judg-
ments may not reflect consideration of antitrust concerns. 2 Indeed,
agencies often view antitrust issues as distractions. For example, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had express antitrust
authority on the theory that, having been developed by the taxpayer,
nuclear power should not be subject to further monopolization.1 3
However, even the NRC, which has conducted highly judicialized
antitrust proceedings, had severely curtailed its antitrust enforce-
ment, finding such reviews "not a sensible use of our limited
112 For example, while citing no evidence that revenues in the Midwest
are insufficient to allow owners of generating facilities to recover investment
costs, FERC has noted the need to ensure that "rates are just and reasonable
for buyers and sellers" in accepting mitigation measures that could allow sell-
ers to double or triple prices over competitive levels. See Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 109 F.E.R.C. 61,157, at 215-21 (2004),
order on reh'g, 111 F.E.R.C. 91 61,043 (2005). Similar revenue sufficiency claims,
including the need to generate enough revenues to recover fixed costs, are
made in support of bid caps of $1,000 per megawatt hour and higher on spot
market energy sales, even though utilities typically recover fixed costs
through separate capacity payments or through regulated rate-base recovery.
Id. at 91 302. The variable cost of producing electricity is usually far less than
$1,000 per megawatt hour.
113 Atomic Energy Act 42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1954); Consumers Power Co.,
6 N.R.C. 892, 897 (1977). This antitrust jurisdiction was repealed by section
625 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 199 Stat. 594 (2005).
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resources needed to fulfill our primary mission." 114 Although the
openness of the NRC's avoidance of antitrust enforcement was strik-
ing, even in Gulf States, which reversed the FPC for failing to con-
sider the anticompetitive effect of granting approval of a security
issuance under a "compatible with the public interest" test, the
Supreme Court recognized that the FPC had to harmonize its consid-
eration of antitrust allegations with the exigencies of the need for the
particular security issuances." 5
Other agencies have primary missions that may conflict with their
antitrust enforcement role. For example, FERC may deem it more
important to advance a particular vision of industry structure rather
than to limit accretions of market power that result from conduct
within such a structure. A recent example is FERC's approval of the
merger of Exelon Corporation and Public Service Enterprise Group
(PSEG) to create the nation's largest utility. FERC allowed the concen-
tration under common ownership of an unprecedented amount of gen-
eration capacity in part because the merging companies are members of
the PJM Interconnection, a Regional Transmission Organization that
has been a poster-child for the Commission's vision for future." 6 And
the FCC has been notably acquiescent in, indeed a facilitator of, poten-
tially harmful consolidation in communications industries." 7
114 Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., CLI-99-19, 49 N.R.C. 441 (1999), 64 Fed. Reg.
33,916, at 33,925 (June 24, 1999) (discontinuing review of license transfer
applications for antitrust considerations); see also Antitrust Review Authority:
Clarification, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,649 at 44,656 (July 19, 2000) (codified at 10 C.F.R.
pts. 2 and 50) ("[Tlhere are other antitrust authorities and forums with far
greater antitrust expertise than the Commission to address potential antitrust
problems with proposed mergers and acquisitions of owners of nuclear
power facilities.").
"5 Gulf States Utilities v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 749, 762-64 (1973).
116 Exelon Corporation, Pub. Serv. Enter. Corp., 112 F.E.R.C. 1 61,011, at
103-99 (2005).
117 See, e.g., 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 13,620 (2003) (relaxing local and
national television station ownership rules, local television/radio station
cross-ownership rules, and newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rules), affd
in part and remanded in part, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372
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3. GIVING AGENCIES EXCLUSIVE ANTITRUST AUTHORITY FOR REGULATED
INDUSTRIES WILL RESULT IN ANTITRUST NONENFORCEMENT Critiques of
agency capture problems in the 1970s prompted movement to increase
the effectiveness of regulatory bodies and to make them function
more in accord with legal norms. Thus, in a series of important
decisions, federal courts required agencies to afford more due process
and reasoned decisionmaking in their decisions."18 And public policy
advocates pushed, sometimes successfully, for more vigorous open
hearing rules, stricter ex parte contact regulations, abolishment of
"secret law" advisory opinions, and changes designed to increase
citizen and public interest participation in hearings through proxy
advocates and intervenor funding programs."t9
(3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2904 (2005); Applications of Nextel
Commc'ns, Inc. and Sprint Corp. for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses
and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 05-148 (rel.
August 8, 2005) (approving merger effectively reducing to three the number
of national wireless providers); Applications of AT&T Wireless Servs. and
Cingular Wireless Corp. for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and
Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,522 (2004)
(approving transfer of all AT&T Wireless licenses to Cingular Wireless, com-
bining the nation's second and third largest wireless telecommunications car-
riers); Applications for Consent to Transfer of Licenses from Comcast Corp.
and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23, 246 (2002) (approving merger of
the nation's largest and third largest cable operators). The FCC also currently
has pending before it applications for consent to SBC Communications Inc.'s
acquisition of AT&T (FCC Public Notice, DA 05-656 (rel. March 11, 2005)),
and Verizon's acquisition of MCI Corp. (FCC Public Notice, DA 05-762 (rel.
March 24, 2005)), which most observers believe that the FCC will grant.
118 See Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
119 See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., TAMING THE BUREAUCRACY: MUSCLES,
PRAYERS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES (1989); Robert B. Leflar & Martin H. Rogol,
Consumer Participation in the Regulation of Public Utilities: A Model Act, 13 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 235 (1976); WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION (1983); CENTER FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, WORKING ON THE SYS-
TEM: A COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR CmzEN ACCESS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES (James
R. Michael & Ruth C. Fort eds., 1974); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and
How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J.
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In some ways, the Trinko decision seems animated by a view of
the administrative process that conforms to the adjudicatory ideal
that many of the 1970s reformers were trying to implement. But the
modern agencies do not act like courts over a broad range of regu-
lated agency decisionmaking and enforcement. Increasingly, agencies
inform themselves and make decisions not through administrative
hearings or an official record, but through more informal rulemakings,
policy statements, and various forms of conferences, meetings and
communications with interested parties of all stripes, including those
who are regulated, and with those who are benefited or hurt by regu-
lation or nonregulation. Agency policy is negotiated in both subtle
and nonsubtle ways. Traditional cases are increasingly avoided or rel-
egated to the background. This process may be applauded, decried,
or both, but the fact is that regulatory bodies are increasingly avoid-
ing adjudicatory procedures.
One of the agencies where this tendency is most pronounced is
the FCC. It is notable that the FCC decision referred to by the Court in
Trinko as providing a "regulatory framework" that "diminishes the
likelihood of major antitrust harm" 120 did not result from an adjudica-
tory hearing process, but from an informal rulemaking process of
written comments, written reply comments, and ex parte contacts
with the FCC by interested parties. 121 Whatever can be said of the
enforcement process followed by the agency in the case, Trinko was
not a vibrant example of due process.
Examples may convey the problem better than text. During the
1960s the FPC, the predecessor to FERC, acquired the daunting task of
regulating the prices of nonpipeline as well as pipeline interstate natu-
525 (1972); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings,
81 YALE L.J 359 (1972); Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade
Commission, 59 GEO. L.J. 777 (1971); Nicholas Johnson, A New Fidelity to the
Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869 (1971); Arthur E. Bonfield, Public Participation
in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Con-
tracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
120 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
121 In re Application of Bell Ati. N. Y., 15 F.C.C.R. 3953, 3956 & n.2 (1999)
(cited in Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413).
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ral gas. 122 This meant that the FPC had to regulate the prices of thou-
sands of individual gas producers, wells and contracts, each of which
had different costs and rates.123 After hearings, the FPC imposed ceil-
ing price conditions to new certificates to sell gas based on the "in
line" contracted prices in areas of proposed sales. 124 These prices were
to generally remain effective until rate case hearings could take place,
subject to refund of charges that were later determined to be excessive.
With limited exceptions, the FPC regulated gas prices through massive
area rate cases for each producing area. Ceiling prices were set by
hearing processes, which included discovery, testimony of fact and
expert witnesses, cross-examination, briefing, and judicial review.
More recently, FERC has embarked on a restructuring of the electric
power industry, departing from a traditional cost-of-service regulatory
model under which electric companies sell wholesale power based upon
their costs. 12 The magnitude of this restructuring effort is comparable to
the FPC's natural gas producer rate regulation efforts. But, unlike in pro-
ducer rate regulation, there have been few electricity restructuring hear-
ings to determine significant matters. The major electric restructuring
orders came about through rulemakings without hearings.12 Regulation
has been implemented mainly by agency suasion and negotiations. Vir-
tually all orders affecting Regional Transmission Organizations result
from filings by those organizations and a comment and reply process.127
122 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
123 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1968).
124 United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Props., Inc., 382 U.S. 223
(1965).
125 See Part I.A. supra.
126 E.g., Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540; Regional Transmission Orga-
nizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (Jan. 6, 2000), reprinted in
[1996-2000 Regs. Preambles] FERC Stat. & Regs. 31,089 (2000), order on
reh'g, Order No. 2000-A, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 2000), reprinted in
[1996-2000 Regs. Preambles] FERC Stat. & Regs. 1 31,092 (2000), petitions for
review dismissed per curiam for want of standing sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1
v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
127 See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 111
F.E.R.C. I 61,043 (2005); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.,
102 F.E.R.C. 1 61, 280 (2003).
A REAL WORLD PERSPECTIVE : 621
A parallel process takes place under which FERC holds confer-
ences attended by commissioners, key staff, and representatives from
various industry groups and their opponents that are selected by the
agency. Written comments are allowed and encouraged, but presenta-
tions and submissions are neither under oath nor subject to cross-
examination. Examples of conference topics include new transmission
construction and incentives to promote such construction,128 as well
as a range of market power-related topics. 129 Thus, FERC is not
informing itself or making decisions based upon traditional due pro-
cess trial-type hearings, as it had in the past.
Additionally, representatives of virtually all interested parties
meet freely with FERC commissioners and key staff to discuss issues
that they deem important. Meetings with commissioners are permit-
ted before cases are filed. Additionally, FERC broadly permits off-the-
record communications for notice and comment rulemakings, many
investigations, technical, policy and other conferences, and in many
compliance matters.130 To take one recent example, before Exelon and
PSEG filed with FERC for approval of their mega-merger, all four
FERC commissioners met privately with Exelon and PSEG executives
to discuss the parameters of the companies' proposed merger applica-
tion. A FERC spokeswoman would not comment directly on the accu-
sation of improper commissioner contacts because the case was
pending, but did say the agency has "'a longstanding practice of
being available to market participants and members of the general
public for pre-filing meetings."' 1 31
128 FERC Docket Nos. AD05-5-000 (initiated March 21,2005) and PL03-1-000
(initiated January 7, 2003).
129 FERC Docket Nos. RM04-7-000 (initiated April 14, 2004) and PL04-9-000
(initiated May 11, 2004).
130 Regulations Governing Off-the-Record Communications, 64 Fed. Reg.
51,222 (Sept. 22, 1999), reprinted in [1996-2000 Regs. Preambles] FERC Stat.
and Regs. 91 31,079 (1999), order on reh'g, 65 Fed. Reg. 71,254 (Nov. 30, 2000),
reprinted in [1996-2000 Regs. Preambles] FERC Stat. and Regs. 1 31,112 (2000)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201).
131 Citizen groups slam Exelon-PSEG merger, rip FERC meetings with com-
pany officials, INSIDE FERC, at 4 (Apr. 4, 2005).
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Such conferences are common and include all segments of the
industry, including those represented by the authors of this article.
They may be useful in providing information for FERC commission-
ers and key staff and allow regulators to communicate agency needs
to regulated entities. They may even be necessary under an industry
structure where deregulated sales of power amount to billions of dol-
lars per year. FERC may be unable to regulate individual transactions
directly and may have to rely on general rules in securing competitive
market structures. But these functions do not ensure proper antitrust
enforcement.
This failure to follow rudimentary traditional procedures has not
gone unnoticed by the appellate courts. In Electric Power Supply Ass'n
v. FERC,132 the D.C. Circuit overturned FERC's contention that market
monitors could communicate directly with FERC on contested case
matters.
We use FERC as an example of regulation by negotiation, but this
phenomenon of departing from case regulation is not limited to FERC
and the FCC. A 1999 report from the general counsel of the NRC on
re-examining the NRC's hearing process states:
We have also identified the trend in statute law and in much administra-
tive practice to move away from formalized adjudication, with its win-
ner-take-all courtroom model, toward alternative procedures, aimed at
finding solutions that both satisfy legal requirements and accommodate a
variety of interests.
In the last several years, moreover, the Chairman and other Commission-
ers have created a number of opportunities outside the agency's Section
189 hearing processes to conduct informal meetings with members of the
public and other stakeholders, both in Washington, and in communities
close to nuclear power plants that were experiencing performance prob-
lems. The feedback on such informal meetings has been, by most
accounts, extremely positive. This experience has raised the question of
whether some of the elements of the give and take in these settings could
be productively introduced into the agency's Section 189 processes. The
foregoing discussion as well as observations such as those of the Advi-
sory Committee on External Regulation of [the Department of Energy],
that "trials are not always ... useful in the regulatory context", and that
they "consume a disproportionate amount of time in highly formal pro-
132 391 F.3d 1255, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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cesses such as discovery and cross-examination which are expensive for
all concerned" suggest that the formality of NRC hearings is not only
unnecessary legally, but may even be counterproductive in terms of pro-
viding an appropriate vehicle for participation by affected individuals or
an understanding of the issues by a broader public.133
Other agencies have been embarking on similar journeys away from
adjudicatory models of rulemaking and law enforcement.134
Although courts have shown disquietude with this trend away
from adjudication, they have also blessed it.135 It may be that use of
some of the new processes, in addition to some of the litigation reme-
dies within the agencies and in courts, are better suited to the regula-
tion of the modern economy. Mistrust of the traditional processes runs
high. Trials can be costly, inefficient, and slow. However, the issue is
whether agencies can substitute for courts in meaningfully enforcing
antitrust law. Where there is no assurance that agencies will give
focused examinations of factual situations in light of antitrust princi-
ples, free of undue industry influence, the substitution of agencies for
courts will result in the abandonment of antitrust enforcement.
The foregoing review of agency decisionmaking demonstrates the
risk of antitrust nonenforcement associated with turning antitrust
133 Karen D. Cyr, NRC, Re-examination of the NRC Hearing Process (1999),
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission
/secys/1999/secy1999-006/1999-006scy.html# 1_3.
134 Starting in the early 1990s, the D.C. Circuit became increasingly frus-
trated with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) reliance on infor-
mal policy development, and chastised EPA for failing to use notice and
comment rulemaking procedures. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208
F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Several words in a regulation may spawn
hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more detail regard-
ing what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law is made, without
notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in
the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations."); see also Gen. Elec.
Co. v EPA, 290 F. 3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
135 E.g. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that formal adjudication need not be held on issuance by EPA of
orders to specific parties requiring cleanups of toxic waste, and that a public
hearing was sufficient); Penobscot Air Servs. Ltd. v. FAA, 164 F.3d 713 (1st Cir.
1999) (approving FAA's dismissal of a complaint without an oral hearing).
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over to administrative agencies: significant anticompetitive activity
could be immunized from antitrust attack. The Supreme Court has
held that the antitrust laws do not condemn state action that monopo-
lizes or regulates industry in ways that permit private parties to
engage in anticompetitive conduct. 136 This state action immunity from
antitrust enforcement (on the ground that the antitrust laws are
directed against private and not state action) has permitted private
parties who act pursuant to state law to claim antitrust protection for
otherwise unlawful, anticompetitive conduct. So concerned was the
Supreme Court that this immunized private anticompetitive conduct
should really be state action, it insisted that for immunity to apply the
state authorization for the anticompetitive conduct must be "clearly
articulated ... as state policy" and "actively supervised."137 Although
we do not here advocate a comparable immunity associated with fed-
eral agency action, the Supreme Court should be at least as demand-
ing of federal administrative proceedings if the result is to immunize
the private actor from antitrust enforcement. There ought to be a clear
demonstration that any immunized anticompetitive conduct is neces-
sary to the agency's mission; that the regulatory immunity is articu-
lated and intended rather than implied; and that the agency involved
is in fact regulating industry conduct in pursuit of an appropriate
competition policy.
III. CONCLUSION: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT THROUGH
THE COMPLEMENTARY EXERCISE OF COURT AND
AGENCY AUTHORITY SHOULD BE MAINTAINED
As we have seen, Trinko's strict holding only addresses the ques-
tion of whether, if the FCC promulgates an access rule, violation of
that rule creates a section 2 refusal to deal claim. To the extent that the
Court suggests that lower courts should avoid section 2 enforcement
in areas where agencies have jurisdiction, this either-courts-or-agencies
136 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
137 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)); see also Patrick v. Burgett, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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approach to antitrust enforcement will often result in no enforcement.
Instead, agencies and courts can and should complement each other
in providing effective antitrust controls.
We have seen in Part I that despite suggestions to the contrary in
the Trinko dicta, antitrust enforcement is necessary in regulated indus-
tries because such industries lack sufficient competitive response
potential to prevent the sustained exercise of market power; in Part II
we have seen that due to political and institutional pressures, as well
as the continuing move away from adjudicatory processes, regulatory
agencies cannot, by themselves, adequately provide necessary
enforcement. However, agencies often have broad jurisdiction over
particular industry market structure and transactions and particular-
ized knowledge of the industries. Thus, agencies and courts should
work together to prevent violations of the antitrust laws and to
ensure consumer welfare.
Today's electricity industry provides a ready example of where
antitrust courts and regulatory agencies can and should play comple-
mentary roles. A consensus presently exists that the U.S. transmission
grid is inadequate to accommodate the demands of buyers and sellers in
the wholesale electricity markets that are spawned by FERC's open
access policies. 138 Over the past 25 years, transmission investment has
lagged far behind the growth in electricity demand. In addition,
increased transmission usage results from technology and market struc-
tures that now permit generation to serve distant markets and a con-
comitant increased reliance on competitive markets to supply electricity.
A principal impediment to new investment in the transmission
grid is the reluctance of vertically integrated utilities to expand the
grid, thereby exposing their generation assets to increased competi-
tion.139 FERC has recognized this problem:
Market participants also complain that companies that own both trans-
mission and generation under-invest in transmission because the result-
ing competitive entry often decreases the value of their generation assets.
138 See Transmission Access Policy Study Group, Effective Solutions for
Getting Needed Transmission Built at Reasonable Cost 5 (June 2004), http://www
.tapsgroup.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/effectivesolutions.pdf.
139 Id. at 6.
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Much of this problem is directly attributable to the remaining incentives
and ability of vertically integrated utilities to exercise transmission mar-
ket power to protect their own generation market share. 140
In other words, the transmission monopolist uses its control over
transmission to protect its generation investments from the competi-
tion that would be facilitated by an expanded grid.
The refusal or reluctance to expand the transmission grid persists
despite the opportunity to receive attractive, guaranteed returns on
transmission investments. 41 Moreover, many transmission owners
have rebuffed efforts by other market participants, such as municipal
and cooperative utilities, to invest in and own portions of the trans-
mission grid,142 even though these new investors would bring capital
to a transmission grid in great need of expansion.
These refusals to build and to allow others to participate in trans-
mission ownership and investment injure competition. They limit the
availability of transmission itself. Investments that should be made
are not made, and the resulting transmission sales that the expanded
grid could support do not occur. Inadequate transmission also limits
the output of generation. Power that can be produced from existing
generating plants cannot reach potential customers due to transmis-
sion constraints, as a result of which the plants produce less than they
140 Proposed Pricing Policy for Efficient Operation and Expansion of the
Transmission Grid, Notice of Proposed Policy Statement, Docket No. PL03-1-000,
102 F.E.R.C. T 61,032 (2003).
141 Because it remains subject to cost-based regulation that ensures an
opportunity to earn a steady return, usually in excess of 10%, the transmis-
sion business remains profitable. See Transmission Access Policy Study
Group, supra note 138, at 9-10. For example, FERC has allowed a 12.88%
equity return (in addition to congressionally allowed tax benefits) for nearly
risk-free investments during a period when money costs have been near an
all-time low. See Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 100
F.E.R.C. 9U 61,292 (2002), reh'g denied, 102 F.E.R.C. 9 61,143 (2003), order on
remand, 106 F.E.R.C. 9 61,302 (2004), affd sub nom. Pub. Ser. Comm'n of Ky. v.
FERC, 397 F.3d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
142 See, e.g., Protest of New England Consumer-Owned Entities submit-
ted in ISO New England, Inc., FERC Docket Nos. RT04-2-000, ER04-116-002,
ER04-157-005, and EL01-39-002, 106 F.E.R.C. T 61,280 (2004), order on reh'g,
109 F.E.R.C. 61,147 (2004).
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might otherwise. Developers of new plants may be unable to build or
be forced to build less efficient plants.143 In some parts of the country,
plant developers have been forced to sell their facilities to the trans-
mission owner/competitor, often at distressed prices, resulting in a
diminution of competition and an increase in market concentration.1"
The vertically integrated incumbent also benefits from the resulting
higher prices, while consumers are worse off. 145
Vertically integrated transmission owners may defend their
actions, alleging that they acquired their monopoly position as a
result of historical accident or acumen.146 Regardless of how they
obtained their transmission monopolies, maintaining them through
143 Approximately 94% of new generation facilities are natural gas units
that, unlike larger coal burning plants or renewables such as hydroelectric and
wind, can be sited close to load and are therefore less dependent on transmis-
sion. See Transmission Access Policy Study Group, supra note 138, at 5-6.
14 Such concerns have been particularly pronounced with respect to
Entergy Corporation, a large electric utility operating in the southern United
States, in whose service territory a number of nonutility generating companies
constructed plants in recent years because of proximity to natural gas fuel
sources from the Gulf of Mexico. Despite the existence of a FERC-mandated
open access tariff, allegations have been made that generators have been
unable to secure firm transmission paths to deliver the output of their genera-
tion to market. These concerns are set forth in the records of several FERC
cases examining Entergy's transmission practices and their effects. See, e.g.,
Entergy Servs., Inc., 109 F.E.R.C. 61,282 (2004), order on reh'g, 111 F.E.R.C.
T 61,145 (2005), reh'g pending; Entergy Servs., Inc., 111 F.E.R.C. 61,507
(2005); Perryville Energy Partners, LLC, 109 F.E.R.C. T 61,019 (2004), reh'g
denied, 111 F.E.R.C. 1 61,006 (2005).
145 In recent years, FERC has encouraged the development of centrally
clearing electricity spot markets in which prices are set by the offer of the
marginal generating unit. All sellers whose offers are at or below the clearing
price are paid the clearing price, and an increase in that clearing price yields
higher revenues to those sellers. See generally SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION
WORK IN ELECTRICITY, at 121-91 (2002). Thus, although control over transmis-
sion operations is not allowed (in theory) to be used to self-advantage in
power sales competition, companies owning both generation and transmis-
sion in the same market benefit from higher electricity prices usually found in
markets with constrained transmission.
146 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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anticompetitive output restrictions and refusals to deal should not be
tolerated. The harm associated with these output restrictions and
refusals to deal is demonstrated by the monopolists' willingness to
forgo expansion that would increase their transmission revenues and
profits in order to protect their generation sales from competition. 14 7
Furthermore, because the modern transmission grid requires trans-
mission monopolists to work with adjacent systems, such monopo-
lists have invariably entered into agreements to govern grid
147 The "single monopoly profit" theory holds that because monopolists
can capture all of the monopoly profits in a given market regardless of their
having monopolies in related vertical markets (and that they cannot capture
further profits if they do), vertical integration by a monopolist does not lead
to the consumer harms of higher prices and lower output, although it might
require potential competitors to enter the industry at both levels in order to
avoid being forced to deal exclusively with the monopolist at either level. See
AREEDA, supra note 66, at I 756b2; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
229-31 (1978); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23-24. (1st
Cir. 1990). On the basis of this theory, some may be tempted to argue that
there is no harm in allowing generation monopolists to gain or maintain a
transmission monopoly. Leaving aside the limitations of the single monopoly
profit theory (for which see, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Michael D. Whinston, Tying,
Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990); Dennis W. Carlton
and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market
Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 205, 212 (2002)), it does not
apply to the use of monopoly power in one market to prevent competition in
another, as is the case here: because transmission is a natural monopoly, as
discussed in Part I.B., it would be highly difficult (and inefficient) for a com-
petitor to enter at both levels by building its own transmission facilities to
reach the monopolist's generation market. Thus, maintaining a stranglehold
on transmission effectively prevents competition from outside generation,
and, as Steven Salop has explained, when a monopolist faces potential com-
petition and attempts "an exclusionary strategy in order to deter or destroy
that emerging competition," then "the single monopoly profit theory, and its
strong policy implications about the efficiency of integration, clearly would
not apply." Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Eco-
nomic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 625-26
(1999). If, as the Supreme Court said of Kodak's parts and service strategy, a
transmission owner's output restrictions and refusals to deal are "part of a
scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have
violated" section 2 of the Sherman Act. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techni-
cal Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482 (1992) (citations omitted).
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operations that may include provisions to expand the transmission
grid. Yet such monopolists often refuse participation by those who do
not currently own transmission. 14 8
In the face of this competitive harm, antitrust courts should not sit
on the sidelines in fear of interfering with innovation or risktaking.
Monopolists are standing in the way of innovation and risktaking by
those who seek to expand the transmission grid. The result is lower
output and impaired competition, both in transmission as well as
generation. Moreover, when one is considering the transmission grid,
it is fair to ask exactly what innovation the incumbent monopoly
owners are likely to promote that the entry of other owners might
impede. In most cases it is doubtful whether business acumen played
any role in the monopolist's acquiring its domination other than the
business acumen associated with acquiring monopoly rights.14 9 More-
over, once transmission owners acquire dominance, business acumen
and innovation rarely play any role in maintaining that dominant
position. Rather, the monopolist is standing in the way of those who
could offer a better product through their own business acumen,
thereby maintaining monopolization of the generation and power
sales markets.
148 There are examples, especially in parts of the Midwest, where trans-
mission incumbents have opened the grid to municipal and cooperative own-
ership. These arrangements are described in the appendix to Effective
Solutions for Getting Needed Transmission Built at Reasonable Cost, supra note
138. In Wisconsin, the American Transmission Co., created pursuant to state
law, allows participation in the grid by all load-serving entities. Recently,
MidAmerican Energy Co., which operates largely in Iowa and parts of Illi-
nois, Nebraska and the Dakotas, entered into an agreement with the Midwest
Municipal Transmission Group to permit such participation. See MidAmeri-
can Energy Co., FERC Docket Nos. ER96-719-000, EL05-59-000 (Aug. 1, 2005,
Filing Letter at 3-4, Att. A); FERC Docket No. ER05-1235-000 (July 22, 2005,
Filing Letter at 9).
149 Monopoly electric utility companies have mainly obtained their domi-
nance as a result of governmental franchises, control of transmission itself
(which blocks alternatives to would-be competitors), mergers and often
monopoly power abuse. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973); Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Fla. Power Light & Co., 573 F.2d 292 (5th
Cir. 1978); Fla. Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), 14 N.R.C. 116
(1981), vacated, 15 N.R.C. 639 (1982); Consumers Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892 (1977).
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It may be argued that antitrust intervention will require a court to
maintain continuing oversight of the shared ownership or operation
of the transmission grid. 150 However, Otter Tail shows that this need
not be the case. There, the antitrust court ordered remedial access to
the transmission grid while the regulatory agency oversaw its imple-
mentation. 151 Similarly, in Florida Municipal Power Agency v. Florida
Power & Light Co.,152 antitrust license condition violations were
alleged, and the court referred the matter to FERC for advice before
making a ruling. In the case of today's transmission grid, an antitrust
court could enjoin the transmission monopolist's refusal to deal with
entities looking to invest in transmission. 5 3 It could require the
monopolist to file a joint rate with other parties who own transmis-
sion that would contribute to an integrated grid, or who want to
invest in such transmission. 15 4 FERC would have regulatory oversight
of the resulting arrangements. The regulatory standards applied by
FERC in such a case would help ensure that the joint arrangements
achieve their purpose. 5
It may also be argued that if FERC can regulate the arrangements
once entered into, it can order such arrangements in the first
instance. A short answer is that FERC has not yet ordered such relief.
Furthermore, the transmission owners subject to such a regulatory
challenge might well argue that FERC may only regulate arrange-
ments entered into in the first instance by private parties, not order
parties, ab initio, to do something they would not otherwise have
15 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
'51 Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 375. Similarly, in a series of antitrust cases under
its statutory antitrust authority, Atomic Energy Act, § 105(c), 42 U.S.C.
2135(c), the NRC ordered monopoly companies to grant transmission access
and other relief under tariffs that were to be administered by FERC. See, e.g.,
Consumers Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892.
152 81 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
"53 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912) (order-
ing defendant railroads to admit existing and future railroads to joint owner-
ship and control arrangements on just and reasonable terms).
1 54 See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. 366; FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952).
155 See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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done.156 They may seek to use influence to prevent such relief.157 By
contrast, an antitrust court can use its considerable remedial powers to
order such a filing as relief for Sherman Act violations without the
obstacles confronting regulatory agencies. As shown above,'5 where an
antitrust violation exists, the antitrust court should not abdicate its obli-
gation to remedy it.
Finally, it may be claimed that an antitrust court's requiring joint par-
ticipation in the transmission grid "compel[s] negotiation between com-
petitors [, which] may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion." 59 Here, too, implementation of the remedy by the regulator
will provide a supervision mechanism that should help to prevent exclu-
sionary conduct. Further, as suggested above, transmission monopolists,
through joint operating and similar arrangements, are already acting in
concert with other utilities, only they are excluding disfavored, willing
market participants, clearly contrary to the antitrust laws.16 Even the
Trinko Court views such exclusionary, concerted action as appropriate
for antitrust enforcement, because it "presents greater anticompetitive
15 See Mobile-Sierra United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.,
350 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1956); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 352-53,
355 (1956) (relations between parties may be set initially by voluntary con-
tracts that are subject to subsequent regulation). We disagree, however, that
FERC, had it the will, would not have had the authority to find that trans-
mission arrangements that exclude certain market participants violate the
FPA's requirements for just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory
rates. Central Iowa Power Coop. v. FERC, 606 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Mid-Continent Area Power Pool ordered to admit smaller public power
members on nondiscriminatory basis). FERC has broad authority to remedy
discriminatory and anticompetitive practices. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at
21,560-21,570. Further, FERC has broad power to correct wrongdoing or to
condition the grant of a privilege. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379
F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747, 766-67, 777-84 (1968) (FERC has broad authority to impose morato-
ria and other limitations on rate filings necessary to preserve rate stability).
157 See Part II.B., supra.
158 See Part II.A., supra.
159 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
160 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); United States v. Associated Press,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); United
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concerns and is amenable to a remedy that does not require judicial esti-
mation of free-market forces: simply requiring that the outsider be
granted nondiscriminatory admission to the club." 161 In ordering
expanded transmission ownership as an antitrust remedy, the antitrust
court can leave to FERC implementation of the resulting arrangements.
The desirability of complementary court and agency enforcement
is not limited to the electricity industry, and the concept is not a new
one. The benefits of such an approach were noted years ago, as Judge
J. Skelly Wright put the matter:
Despite a continuing debate, it appears that the basic goal of direct gov-
ernmental regulation through administrative bodies and the goal of indi-
rect governmental regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same-to
achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible.... This theory
of complementary regulation appears to borne out by the Supreme Court
cases holding that regulated industries must, to some degree at least,
accommodate the antitrust laws. 162
Antitrust scholars echo this view. 63
Because antitrust provides central, legal principles that underlie
our economy, courts have determined that "public interest," "public
convenience and necessity," "just and reasonable," and similar regu-
latory statutory language must be deemed to incorporate references
to antitrust policy1 64 As the Supreme Court put the matter in Southern
Steamship Co. v. NLRB,' 65 a non-antitrust case, "[flrequently the entire
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 1952).
161 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 n.3.
162 N. Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see
also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Consumers
Power Co., 6 N.R.C. 892 (1977); Gulf States Utils. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
163 See Bush & Mayne, supra note 12, at 213; Harry First, Regulated Dereg-
ulation: The New York Experience in Electric Utility Deregulation, 33 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 911, 927-28 (2002).
164 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); Gulf States,
411 U.S. 747; Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390
U.S. 238 (1968); and cases cited in Northern Natural Gas, 399 F.2d at 958.
165 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
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scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of
one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of
an administrative body that it undertake this accommodation without
excessive emphasis upon its immediate task."
Likewise, antitrust courts may certainly take into account regula-
tory requirements applied to particular industries in determining
whether antitrust violations have occurred and assessing appropriate
remedies.1 66 However, especially in view of the fact that regulatory
agencies rarely, if ever, directly enforce the antitrust laws, and given
the obstacles to effective agency enforcement described above, it
makes little sense not to permit court remedies that are parallel and
complementary to agency regulation. This is especially true when
modern regulatory agencies are conducting fewer and fewer trials
and are often regulating by negotiation.
The Trinko Court raises concerns that such dual jurisdiction can
lead to duplicative proceedings and conflicting requirements and that
courts cannot fashion appropriate antitrust relief in regulated indus-
tries.167 However, these objections are more theoretical than real. Com-
plementary jurisdiction has not posed problems to date or, at least if it
has, the Supreme Court does not cite evidence of such problems. In
fact, there has been no real showing that agencies do not welcome
court antitrust enforcement, which expends none of their resources
and can lead to procompetitive results for which they cannot be politi-
cally blamed. 168 We have never heard of any NRC objection to the idea
that the courts can enforce NRC antitrust license conditions.169 By the
166 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406.
167 Id. at 406, 415.
168 FERC has recognized the role that antitrust enforcement has played in
wholesale customers' gaining transmission access. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 21,546 n.51.
169 United States, ex rel. W. Area Power Admin. v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co.,
714 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 64 F.3d 614 (11th Cir. 1995), mandate enforced, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1313
(M.D. Fla. 1999). The cited cases enforced NRC antitrust nuclear plant license
conditions, a task that the NRC itself has not appeared anxious to do. For
example, in the Florida Municipal Power Agency-Florida Power & Light Co. litiga-
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same token, agencies can implement judicial (and other administra-
tive) remedies.170
Treating courts and agencies as complementary bodies permits
more effective remedies than if courts and agency jurisdictions are
deemed inherently separate. Regulated industries, including electricity,
natural gas and oil pipelines, telecommunications and transportation,
tend to be among our most important and most vulnerable to
antitrust problems, if for no other reason than that historically they
often have had monopoly structures, but they are now evolving
toward competition. Their products and services are essential; if there
were any segments of the economy where one would want strict
antitrust enforcement, it is in regulated industries. Trinko gives no rea-
son to abandon court-enforced antitrust in such industries.
tion, the Florida Municipal Power Agency claimed that Florida Power &
Light's refusal to sell it network transmission service violated the NRC
antitrust conditions. The NRC declined to order Florida Power & Light to sell
network transmission service on the grounds that relief is available at FERC.
In re Fla. Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), 41 N.R.C. 361 (1995).
The NRC cited City of Holyoke Gas & Elec. Dep't v. SEC, 972 F.2d 358 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), in which the SEC deferred to FERC merger jurisdiction.
170 See Otter Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1973).
